'Never heard of it' - Understanding the public's lack of awareness of a new electronic patient record by Bratan, T et al.
Never heard of it – Understanding the publics lack
of awareness of a new electronic patient record
Tanja Bratan PhD,* Katja Stramer BA** and Trisha Greenhalgh MD***
*Research Fellow; **Senior Research Fellow; ***Professor of Primary Health Care, Research Department of Open Learning,
Division of Medical Education, University College London, London, UK
Correspondence
Tanja Bratan
Research Department of Open Learning
Division of Medical Education
University College London
417 Holborn Union Building
Highgate Hill
London N19 5LW
UK
E-mail: t.bratan@ucl.ac.uk
Accepted for publication
8 January 2010
Keywords: awareness, consent,
electronic patient records, health
literacy, public information programme
Abstract
Background The introduction of electronic patient records that are
accessible by multiple providers raises security issues and requires
informed consent – or at the very least, an opportunity to opt out.
Introduction of the Summary Care Record (SCR) (a centrally stored
electronic summary of a patients medical record) in pilot sites in the
UK was associated with low awareness, despite an intensive public
information programme that included letters, posters, leaﬂets, and
road shows.
Aim To understand why the public information programme had
limited impact and to learn lessons for future programmes.
Methods Linguistic and communications analysis of components
of the programme, contextualized within a wider mixed-method
case study of the introduction of the SCR in pilot sites.
Theoretical insights from linguistics and communication studies
were applied.
Results The context of the SCR pilots and the linked information
programme created inherent challenges which were partially but not
fully overcome by the eﬀorts of campaigners. Much eﬀort was put
into designing the content of a mail merge letter, but less attention
was given to its novelty, linguistic style, and rhetorical appeal. Many
recipients viewed this letter as junk mail or propaganda and
discarded it unread. Other components of the information
programme were characterized by low visibility, partly because only
restricted areas were participating in the pilot. Relatively little use
was made of interpersonal communication channels.
Conclusion Despite ethical and legal imperatives, informed consent
for the introduction of shared electronic records may be diﬃcult to
achieve through public information campaigns. Success may be
more likely if established principles of eﬀective mass and interper-
sonal communication are applied.
doi: 10.1111/j.1369-7625.2010.00608.x
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Introduction
Electronic health records and informed consent
Policymakers have high hopes that shared elec-
tronic patient records, accessible by health pro-
fessionals and managers outside the
organization where they are created or stored,
will make healthcare more eﬀective, eﬃcient,
safe, and patient-centered as well as supporting
secondary uses such as audit and research.1,2
Electronic patient records may bring both ben-
eﬁts and risks.3 In relation to the storage and
sharing of sensitive personal health data, for
example, there is a trade-oﬀ between making
data accessible and protecting privacy4,5; public
trust in Internet-based information is low6; and
there are ethical and legal implications of
potential security breaches in Internet-accessible
record systems.7–9
Whilst the sparse research literature summa-
rized in the previous paragraph emphasizes the
need to obtain the data subjects consent before
personal health data are shared, the focus to
date has been on the nature of consent – espe-
cially whether an opt in (informed consent) or
opt out (assumed consent) model is prefera-
ble.10–14 Apart from two pilot studies in the
UK,11,15 we could ﬁnd no previous research on
eﬀorts to inform the public of proposed changes
in how their personal health data are stored.
Policy documents refer somewhat vaguely to the
need to inform the public but lack explicit
guidance on how these should be conducted.16
Against this background, and as part of a
wider study into the introduction of a new
Internet-accessible electronic record in pilot sites
in the UK,5,17,18 we followed the fortunes of the
information programme designed to inform
people in pilot sites of the initiative and seek
their consent for their own record to be
uploaded. Our research questions were (i) How
was the public information programme con-
ducted?; (ii) What was its impact on public
awareness and behaviour – and why?; and (iii)
What are the main lessons learnt for future
programmes? We sought to address these ques-
tions via a detailed qualitative analysis of the
various components of the information
programme, nested within a wider ethnographic
case study of the introduction of the SCR and
HealthSpace.
Public information campaigns: the evidence base
Back in 1947, Hyman and Sheatsley19 summa-
rized the evidence base for eﬀective communi-
cation. In addition to the audience not being
adequately exposed to the message or not paying
attention to it, they suggested, communication
barriers include fear of potential negative out-
comes, alternative readings of the message,
rejection of applicability to self, dismissal of
unappealing recommendations, and apathy.
Two years later Shannon and Weaver published
their classic mathematical model of communi-
cation (Fig. 1), in which communication was
seen to involve a sender, a target recipient, a
message which has to be coded and decoded, a
medium (channel) through which the message
was sent, and a greater or lesser amount of
noise.20 Messages must be carefully targeted to
the intended audience, meaningfully coded (e.g.
using engaging language), and sent via appro-
priate channels (i.e. in a suitable format and
medium) with minimum noise (i.e. things that
distract the audience from the message).21
The Shannon–Weaver model, developed by
engineers at a time when communications
research was heavily inﬂuenced by studies of the
telephone and telegraph, was later reﬁned to
include a recognition that good communication
involves two-way exchange of information (e.g.
the sender knows how the receiver is reacting)22
and greater emphasis on the human elements.23
Berlo, for example, emphasized that the goal of
Sender Coding Medium
Message
Decoding Recipient
Message
Noise
Figure 1 Transmission model of communication [adapted
from Shannon and Weaver20].
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most communication is the transfer of meaning,
which is dependent upon shared concepts, atti-
tudes, and values as well as on the communica-
tion skills of the sender.23 A more recent review
added that mass media communication will be
particularly ineﬀective if the message is regarded
as oﬀensive, disturbing, boring, stale, preachy,
confusing, irritating, misleading, irrelevant,
uninformative, useless, unbelievable, or unmo-
tivating (p. 51) – all key dimensions of mean-
ing.24 A heterogeneous audience will need to be
segmented so that the message can be properly
targeted to diﬀerent subgroups.
In 1969, Bass analysed a large sample of
marketing campaigns and concluded that whilst
mass media campaigns may be eﬀective at cre-
ating awareness, they are, overall, less eﬀective
(by around 15-fold) at changing behaviour than
interpersonal channels.25 At the same time,
sociologist Everett Rogers was building a new
research tradition on interpersonal communica-
tion, introducing and systematically exploring
concepts such as opinion leaders, champions,
change agents, and other embodiments of social
inﬂuence.26
Early research into mass communication had
shown that people already interested in a topic
were more likely to pay attention to new mes-
sages about it.19,27,28 In the 1980s and 1990s,
Rogers theory of interpersonal inﬂuence was
extended using theories of engagement and
mindfulness.24,29–33 According to such theories,
an audience lies somewhere on a continuum
from mindlessness (passive unawareness) to
mindfulness (active engagement with the issue,
seeking further information). Strategies to
increase mindfulness include presenting the
message in an unusual or novel way; creating a
discrepancy between expectation and reality
(e.g. displaying the message in unusual loca-
tions); highlighting a controversy; and including
a request for personal involvement or speciﬁc
action. Such approaches may be even more
important in contemporary society, given the
numerous and sophisticated messages to which
individuals are exposed.
Also in the 1990s, researchers in linguistics
began to explore plain English.34 This body of
work underpins contemporary policies on com-
municating with individuals with low health
literacy or limited English proﬁciency.35 In
short, a message will be understood more readily
if it uses immediate rather than non-immediate
language (see examples in Table 1, message
content). Drawing on this evidence base, the
Plain English Campaign advises that communi-
cations should be short, clear, and presented
in simple, active everyday language (http://
www.plainenglish.co.uk/free_guides.html).
Overall, then, modern communication
research has gradually evolved from a pre-
occupation with mathematical and technical
models to a focus on meaning, engagement, and
understanding. This shift resonates with the
teachings of Aristotle, who argued that messages
are rhetorical – that is, they appeal to an audi-
ence and seek to persuade.36 He believed that an
eﬀective message has three components: logos
(the evidence in the message), ethos (the credi-
bility of the speaker) and pathos (the appeal to
emotions), and suggested various strategies to
increase each of these dimensions. Aristotles
classic work underpins modern-day marketing
principles – for example, that balanced appeals
(which set out both pros and cons) tend to have
greater credibility and impact than unbalanced
ones, especially with sophisticated or knowl-
edgeable audiences.24 In The New Rhetoric,
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca37 have built on
Aristotles speaker-focused model to include a
systematic analysis of the audience. The appeal
of a message to a particular audience, they
argue, depends (among other things) on that
audiences points of departure (i.e. their values,
beliefs and taken-for-granted assumptions).
Persuasion is more likely if the speaker has
determined these points of departure and
tailored the message accordingly.
The above theoretical approaches and models
have contributed to the emerging science of
evidence based health promotion which
underpins health-related public information
campaigns.38–41 However, almost all such cam-
paigns to date have been oriented to changing
individuals health-related behaviour and health
outcomes [see, for example, examples in heart
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health,42 alcohol,43 breast-feeding,44 low back
pain,45 HIV,32 smoking,46 and unnecessary
consultations for minor illness.47] As previous
pilot studies in Hampshire and Staﬀordshire
showed, information campaigns oriented to
informing people about how their personal
health data are stored diﬀer from these in a
number of key aspects15,48:
1. The purpose of the campaign is not merely to
inform but to satisfy the legal requirement to
do so;
2. The message may have less intrinsic interest
value than a topic that directly pertains to
health and which seeks active behaviour
change;
3. The message tends to be generic (i.e. it is
relevant to everyone in the target population
rather than to a particular subgroup such as
smokers), so individuals may feel less per-
sonally engaged;
4. Such campaigns may be carried out in a
politically sensitive climate.
Table 1 Summary of questions used to guide data analysis
Aspect of programme Questions asked in analysis Method of analysis
Message content 1. To what extent does the text of the message conform to
Plan English campaign guidelines?
(http://www.plainenglish.co.uk/free_guides.html)
2. To what extent is immediate language used?30,31 In
particular, to what extent does the message show:
• Denotative speciﬁcity (does it state the agent, object
and action clearly, simply and directly?);
• Spatial immediacy (does it use close demonstratives
such as this, these, here, rather than distant ones
such as that, those, there?);
• Temporal immediacy (does it use the present tense,
rather than conditional or future?); and
• Few or no qualiﬁers (e.g. does it avoid words like
may, might, could, possibly?).
Detailed linguistic analysis of text
of letters, posters and leaﬂets
Message
transmission
3. Who is the sender of the message?20
4. Who is the intended recipient – and to what extent
might the audience need to be segmented and different
messages sent to different subgroups?20
5. To what extent is the transmission channel clear? (e.g.
how much noise is there)20
Analysis of sender and target
audience for letters ⁄ posters ⁄
leaﬂets. Interpretive analysis of
wider case study data for noise.
Message meaning ⁄
signiﬁcance
6. What meaning is the message likely to hold for different
intended recipient groups?23
Contextualization of linguistic
analysis in relation to particular
audiences.
Efforts to engage
audience
7. How and where is the message transmitted? To what
extent is there novelty, surprise and a cue to
action?24,29–33
Efforts to persuade
audience (rhetoric)
8. To what extent is the message balanced? (presenting
both pros and cons)36
9. What level of credibility does the sender of the message
hold with the intended audience(s)?36
10. What are the points of departure of different intended
audiences (i.e. their values, beliefs and taken-for-
granted assumptions) and to what extent have these
been taken into account?37
Linguistic analysis of message, with
a focus on use of rhetoric and
argumentation (associations,
dissociations, metaphors etc).
Interpretive analysis of wider case
study data for audience
characteristics.
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The Summary Care Record and
HealthSpace
The Summary Care Record (SCR) is part of the
National Programme for Information Technol-
ogy (NPfIT) in the English National Health Ser-
vice (NHS). It is a centrally stored summary of
key medical details for use in unscheduled care
settings, created by uploading selected data from
the persons general practitioner (GP) record onto
a central Spine. It is hoped that NHS patients
will eventually be able to access their own SCRvia
a separate technology (HealthSpace). Our team
conducted an independent evaluation of the
introduction of the SCR andHealthSpace in four
pilot sites,5,18 and are continuing to follow the
fortunes of the programme as eﬀorts are made to
roll it out nationally. We were contracted to
provide regular formative feedback to Connect-
ing for Health, the central body charged with
implementing the NPfIT on behalf of the
Department of Health, to inform the national
rollout of the programme.
An extensive public information programme
in the ﬁrst two SCR pilot sites included a letter
sent to every person aged 16 and over for whom
an SCR was to be created, as well as posters,
leaﬂets, road shows, talks to community
groups, local radio and newspaper coverage and
a helpline run by NHS Direct. A conﬁdentiality
pack including the NHS Care Records Guar-
antee (a nationally produced leaﬂet assuring
people of both technical security and controls
over who would access their record) was sent out
on request. Consent was assumed for all indi-
viduals who had not opted out within 16 weeks
of the letter drop. People were also informed
(either as part of the initial SCR campaign or
separately) that they could view their SCR via
the secure HealthSpace website. In contrast to
the SCR, HealthSpace operates on an opt-in
model – that is, people need to actively sign up
for an account. Both Connecting for Health,
and participating Primary Care Trusts (PCTs,
the NHS bodies responsible for commissioning
and overseeing healthcare on behalf of a popu-
lation of 100–250 000) put considerable energy
and resources into the information programme.
Previous work by our team showed that at the
time of these early pilots (2007 to mid-2008),
there was very low public awareness and little
interest in either the SCR or HealthSpace.5,18 By
the date of our individual interviews (early- to
mid-2008), at least 95% of the population in our
sample area should have received a letter
informing them that the SCR was being intro-
duced in their area. However, fewer than 30% of
NHS service users whom we surveyed were
aware of the SCR, and only around one person
in seven claimed to have received the letter about
it. Indeed, one of the most common responses to
our question whether the patient knew anything
about the SCR was [Ive] never heard of it.
Only one in 12 said they had heard of Health-
Space, although the latter was not publicized as
widely as the SCR. Of those who were aware of
the SCR or HealthSpace, one in ﬁve had heard
about it through press articles rather than via
the oﬃcial information programme. A before-
and-after survey of 250 people by a market
research company broadly conﬁrmed these
ﬁndings (unpublished data available from Con-
necting for Health). Interview studies by our-
selves and others showed that most people in the
UK appear happy to allow their personal health
data to be shared amongst health professionals
(indeed, many assumed this was already hap-
pening); they expressed relatively high trust in
the NHS but little if any desire to view their own
SCR using HealthSpace.15,18
Methods
The study was carried out as part of the wider
SCR and HealthSpace evaluation, a large,
mostly qualitative study which explored the
challenges associated with the introduction of
these technologies in four pilot sites.5,18 Ethical
approval for the study was obtained from
Thames Valley Research Ethics Committee
(06 ⁄MRE12 ⁄81 and subsequent amendments).
As explained in detail in our previous publica-
tions,5,18 our overall data set included ethno-
graphic observation in participating healthcare
settings (including how and where information
was available), semi-structured interviews with
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staﬀ and patients, focus groups with selected
service users (e.g. mental health patients) or their
representatives, and documents (letters, emails,
strategy documents, business plans, minutes of
meetings, and so on). This wider study high-
lighted the low levels of awareness described
earlier and provided important context for our
more detailed analysis reported below of how the
public were informed about the programme.
In relation to the public information
programme, we considered the following speciﬁc
data sources as well as relevant material from
the wider study:
1. The letter sent by the two pilot PCTs to target
populations (one chose to target their entire
patient list whereas the other targeted only the
patients of participating GP practices). The
two PCTs sent out a slightly diﬀerent letter
(although both were modelled on a similar
template) and there were also slight variations
between the versions sent to diﬀerent waves
of recipients as GP practices came on board.
2. The NHS Care Records Service leaﬂet, a
folded A5 brochure which was sent as an
enclosure with the above.
3. Oﬃcial posters produced by the communi-
cations leads in the participating PCTs as well
as a more informal, handwritten notice dis-
played in one GP surgery.
4. Mass media initiatives including road shows
and local radio programmes.
5. Visits from PCT staﬀ to minority ethnic
organizations and patient self-help groups.
6. Local newspaper articles and PCT press
releases.
For each genre of communication (letter,
leaﬂet, poster, and so on), and in relation to the
audience and context, we applied a number of
complementary approaches which are summa-
rized in Table 1. The analysis of these docu-
ments was guided by the issues identiﬁed in
section Main ﬁndings. In particular, we
undertook detailed linguistic analysis of the text
and images used in the diﬀerent communica-
tions, and asked questions about the signiﬁcance
and meaning which these held for diﬀerent sec-
tors of the target audience. We found that there
was strong alignment between the ﬁndings of
these diﬀerent approaches so it did not prove
necessary to resolve diﬀerences between them.
Main ﬁndings
Our analysis identiﬁed eight possible explana-
tions, considered in turn below, for the limited
impact of the programme: its politically sensitive
context, the challenge of audience heterogeneity,
lack of clarity about sender and receiver, poor
signal to noise ratio, low plain English score,
ambiguity in key aspects of meaning, poor rhe-
torical appeal, and low levels of audience
engagement. Most of these explanations
included some issues that were avoidable and
some that were unavoidable.
The politically sensitive context of the
programme
This programme occurred in the context of a
number of other government-driven, large-scale
IT initiatives in the UK, which were perceived
by critics as grandiose, politically driven, poor
value for money, and ethically contentious.49,50
There was a vocal civil liberties movement (see
http://www.thebigoptout.com) and threats of
legal challenges, and some GPs in participating
PCTs were strongly opposed to the introduction
of the SCR as they perceived it as conﬂicting
with their duty of conﬁdentiality to patients.5,18
Pressure to provide complete and accurate
information to the public about their right to
opt out, along with political pressure on Con-
necting for Health to create as many shared
records as possible in as short a time frame as
possible, created a sensitive and legalistic atmo-
sphere (for example, the ﬁrst letter sent to the
public about the SCR went through more than
50 iterations and was checked and re-checked by
various oﬃcial bodies and committees).
The challenge of audience heterogeneity
The target audience for the information
programme was geographically restricted but
demographically very diverse. The same message
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was not appropriate for everyone. Both PCT
and general practice staﬀ worked hard to give
customized talks to various voluntary sector,
ethnic minority, and special interest groups, but
reaching the entire target audience in this way
would have been impossible. For practical rea-
sons, drop-in sessions were mostly (although not
exclusively) held during the day, which made
them inaccessible to most of the working pop-
ulation. Furthermore, as receiving a message
about the SCR would be highly confusing to an
individual whose GP was not participating in the
project, mass media messages were strictly con-
tained within particular geographical areas. So,
for example, radio advertisements were only
played on small, local radio stations rather than
on the more popular stations that covered
metropolitan areas.
Lack of clarity about sender and receiver
Many people were unsure who the various
messages were from and whether they were
really the intended recipient. The sender of the
mail merge letter, for example, was unclear to
most people we interviewed. Some of these
letters were oﬃcially sent from the Primary Care
Trust (although the text had been largely drafted
by Connecting for Health staﬀ) and signed by
the Trusts Chief Executive (a person most
people had never heard of). One early example
begins with the personal pronoun I but later on
in the same letter this becomes we – a term
which, in diﬀerent paragraphs, variously
embraces the NHS, NHS Advisors, staﬀ,
GPs, and GP practices. A few general prac-
tices decided to depict a much clearer and
personal sender by addressing the letter from the
practice rather than the PCT. Even in these
letters, however, the PCT, the NHS and
government remained implicit co-senders.
There was also a certain amount of ambiguity
in deﬁning the receiver. Whilst the envelope was
addressed to a named individual, the letter itself
began Dear Patient…. Some of the people we
interviewed indicated that because of this, they
did not feel the message was directly relevant to
them.
Poor signal to noise ratio
Shannon and Weavers concept of noise
(Fig. 1) is highly relevant here. The information
programme for the SCR ran concurrently with
numerous other local and national campaigns,
and posters were typically crowded out on notice
boards (we found them diﬃcult to spot even
when looking for them). Some NHS patients
had received the letter about the SCR at around
the same time as another letter asking them to
participate in the Biobank project (see http://
www.ukbiobank.ac.uk/), which seeks to assess
both genetic risk and health outcomes in a large
sample of the population, and which also seeks
to store peoples health data on a central data-
base. Some interviewees had assumed these
projects were one and the same. The NHS Care
Records Service (CRS) leaﬂet may have added
to the confusion because it tried to contextualize
the SCR within a wider IT programme which
included local detailed (GP-held) records.
Low plain English score
Press articles and materials produced at local
level (e.g. by front line NHS staﬀ) often scored
well against the Plain English Campaign guide-
lines (see section Introduction), although these
ad hoc materials were not designed to convey
full details of the overall campaign message. In
contrast, the mail merge letter sent out by PCTs
contained much important information, some of
which was either legally necessary or considered
prudent to avoid generating anxiety or inﬂaming
the civil liberties movement. It also listed further
sources of information including a more detailed
information pack which people could send for in
diﬀerent languages, as well as an NHS Direct
helpline.
As a result of all this required information,
and perhaps also of redrafting by committee,
the mail merge letter was lengthy (15 para-
graphs), and much of its content was inherently
dull (although ironically the initiative was
described as exciting). The NHS CRS leaﬂet
was similarly detailed and bland. In the original
mail merge letter, the average sentence length
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was 23 words (range 6–40), compared with a
maximum recommended by the Plain English
Campaign of 20 words, and no bullet points
were used to break up text. The leaﬂet used
shorter sentences and some headings and bullet
points, but remained very text heavy. Much
jargon and confusing acronyms had been suc-
cessfully removed in the various iterations of the
letter, although some obscure terminology
remained (e.g. the process of creating a sum-
mary record for you will begin). Similarly,
iterations to simplify language and grammar had
some success (e.g. adverse reactions became
bad reactions) but the ﬁnal version still con-
tained 15 passive verbs (e.g. your consent will be
assumed). Some of the language was non-
immediate (…see a demonstration of what a
typical Summary Care Record would look like;
emphasis added), vague (our intention is…),
and written in an impersonal style despite the
repeated use of the personal pronoun you. The
letter talked of a ﬁrst step (uploading details of
medication and allergies onto the SCR) but not
of any subsequent steps.
Ambiguity in key aspects of meaning
There seemed to be a distinct mismatch between
the understandings of the information
programme organizers and those of some sectors
of the audience. For example, it unfortunately
omitted a crucial item of information – that the
SCR was an electronic record. Some people who
had read the letter had not grasped this funda-
mental fact. Many people had a hazy notion of
what medical records currently existed (e.g.
some interviewees in the pilot sites believed that
their records were already widely shared elec-
tronically and one or two were unaware that
clinicians made any records at all). Local press
articles sometimes did a good job of clarifying
these issues.
Poor rhetorical appeal
In sharp contrast to the highly controversial
context of the SCR pilot programme (described
above), communications sent to the public
appeared to duck the key questions on which a
persons decision to opt in or opt out depended.
The knotty issue of security failures (e.g. the risk
of human malice or error), for example, was not
addressed directly in the mail merge letter, and
the CRS leaﬂet presented the topic in conﬁdent,
absolute terms (…will use the strongest national
and international security measures available
[which will] make sure that your information is
stored safely) rather than facing the controver-
sies square-on (e.g. the information could have
been presented as the risk of your record being
accessed by a hacker or member of staﬀ without
proper permission is extremely small but not
zero). The absolute tone of the assurances
served to lower their credibility, especially at a
time when various data loss scandals by gov-
ernment departments were being reported in the
media. As one participant in focus group of HIV
positive service users put it, My main concern is
anybody hacking into the system. If its a com-
puter, it can be hacked into.
The Communications Department of Con-
necting for Health worked hard to try to reduce
public anxiety about data sharing. For example,
they introduced oﬃcial terminology that a
persons SCR would be created rather than
data being uploaded. But this enforced lan-
guage seemed deliberately to obscure the fact
that data previously accessible only by a few
known and trusted health professionals would
now be potentially accessible by thousands of
NHS staﬀ. People were not told precisely who
would have access to their records or the cir-
cumstances of such accesses. Vague expressions
(e.g. people involved in your treatment and in
a range of locations) suggested obfuscation.
The statement GPs [in this town] have consid-
ered this carefully and believe that its in the
best interest of patients rang hollow when
contrasted with contemporaneous press articles
(e.g. Half of all GPs refuse to put patients
records online – local newspaper headline, 21st
November 2007).
The lack of clarity was partly because the
SCR was an evolving technology for which the
precise contexts of use were still being devel-
oped, and also perhaps an attempt to reﬂect the
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fact that technical aspects of security were
known to be extremely robust. However, the
principles of rhetoric and argumentation suggest
that an honest statement about the uncertainty
of the programme, the possibility of human
error and the extent of local professional dissent
would have been more credible than bland
assurance or systematic vagueness.
Low levels of engagement
Local implementation teams had an uphill
struggle achieving active engagement from the
public because, as described in section Intro-
duction, most people were unengaged and
passive in relation to this issue. We found
some isolated examples of imaginative eﬀorts
to engage the target audience using novel for-
mats and an explicit request. For example, one
general practice produced a handwritten poster
which explained the SCR to patients, told
them why the topic was important, and how
and by when to opt out if they wished to do
so. This poster attracted much attention and
generated discussion. It was innovative, col-
ourful, personalized to the practices own
patients, displayed prominently in a place
where posters were not usually seen (on a ﬂip
chart in the reception area), and had an air of
spontaneity and brainstorming. It also directly
asked patients to decide whether or not to opt
out.
Another source of information that tended to
engage the audience was press coverage. Some of
this was prompted by the PCTs via press releases
and arranged interviews, although most was
produced spontaneously by local and national
newspapers. Local journalists in particular were
skilled in producing simple, short, novel
messages, often personalized using individual
stories. These grabbed the attention; prompted
people to seek more information; and encour-
aged them to debate and form an opinion.
Some press coverage, especially in national
newspapers, was sensationalist and occasionally
overtly misleading but local coverage was gen-
erally accurate, enhanced the oﬃcial informa-
tion programme and may have reached
audiences that would otherwise have been hard
to reach.
The less successful components of the public
information programme did not fully apply the
principles of audience engagement. Posters were
professionally produced but had a very stan-
dard format and were displayed in conventional
healthcare settings. For the minority who were
already engaged with issues such as conﬁdenti-
ality or government surveillance, these posters
sometimes triggered action, but for most, they
had little or no impact. The mail merge letter
looked like numerous other public-sector mail
shots; it included a request (Important: Please
Read), but this was not a clear cue to do
something active (i.e. decide whether to opt out
or not).
Indeed, whilst the letter was strong on the
rhetoric of empowerment (As a patient you
have choices….), the accompanying leaﬂet
assured people that they should do nothing as
records would be created automatically. They
were not told what they might like to weigh up
in making their choice. The over-emphasis on
the beneﬁts of the SCR (such as better and
safer care) without consideration of any
potential disbeneﬁts (e.g. data loss or intrusion)
made the notion of choice seem absurd (who in
their right mind would choose the possibility of
worse or less safe care?). It may have helped to
engage the audience by asking the reader to
balance beneﬁts and risks from their own per-
spective and arrive at a decision.
Discussion
This study of the limited success of the public
information programme in SCR pilot sites
identiﬁed a number of contributing factors
which the communications team could not
inﬂuence – including the sensitivity of the SCR
as a government driven IT programme; the
programmes complex geography (the technol-
ogy was implemented in some GP practices but
not other adjacent ones); the demographic and
social diversity of the target population; and the
very low initial level of public awareness and
interest in shared electronic records. Some
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contributing factors, however, were potentially
remediable – including clarity and simplicity of
the message; attending to the meaning which the
message held for the target audience; ensuring
that arguments were balanced; maximizing
audience engagement, and including a speciﬁc
and immediate appeal to the reader to make a
personal decision about whether to opt out or
not. Perhaps this explains why the levels of
public interest and engagement were even lower
than in previous pilot studies of regional shared
record projects in the UK.11,15,48
Whilst the main data set for this study was
collected in the ﬁrst two PCTs to go live with
the SCR, it is encouraging that versions of the
mail merge letter produced by most PCTs who
have joined the SCR programme more recently
are considerably more appealing and readable
than the ones we studied in depth. In particular,
the message in these later materials more often
has a clear sender and is personalized to the
recipient; it is shorter, clearer and uses more
immediate language; and the text is broken by
the use of bulleted lists. However, even later
versions of the letter and leaﬂet continue to
present the introduction of the SCR as uncon-
troversial and oﬀer assurances that security is
absolute.
The overwhelming majority of individuals
who are asked to consider the personal risks and
beneﬁts of the SCR spontaneously construct an
equation that comes out in favour of having
one.18 Aside from the ethical aspects (if the
beneﬁts of a new technology are unknown,
and ⁄or if it has real or potential drawbacks,
these should be acknowledged), an invitation
which asks people to weigh the beneﬁts of the
SCR against the disbeneﬁts and make their
mind up (perhaps by including an opt-out form
in the same envelope, as piloted elsewhere51)
would probably increase engagement and
prompt action. Whilst a more transparent mes-
sage style might prompt an increase in the pro-
portion of people actively opting out, the
absolute numbers are likely to remain small
(current opt-out rates are less than 1%), and the
proportion of the population whose consent is
informed is likely to increase substantially.
The ﬁndings of this study resonate with the
empirical evidence from the wider communica-
tions literature (see section Introduction) that
mass media campaigns alone, even if they
include personalized letters to individuals, have
limited impact. It follows that such approaches
provide a limited basis for assuming implied
consent. Whilst there is much work to be carried
out to optimize the message and the medium for
mass communications about the SCR, the
potentially powerful impact of interpersonal
communication also needs to be recognized and
exploited. Unpublished data from Connecting
for Health show signiﬁcant diﬀerences in opt-
out rates for the SCR between general practice
populations depending on whether the practice
actively supported the SCR, took a neutral
stance, or expressed internal dissent (e.g. with
one GP resisting a practice decision to be part of
the scheme). Whilst enquiries from patients may
place additional strain on busy GPs (and GPs in
turn may try to negotiate a fee for responding to
these), such input could have a positive impact
on engagement.
This study raises important issues for the
digital inclusion agenda.52 Oﬃcial health policy
in the UK gives great weight to patient
empowerment and seeks to support patients and
citizens in taking more control of their
health.53,54 However, people with low health
literacy may not be able to comprehend health
information, leading to confusion and feelings of
powerlessness,55 and this could increase existing
health inequalities as well as creating new ones
based on access to, or ability to process, elec-
tronic information.52,56 The dont know, dont
care stance taken by much of the lay public
towards shared electronic records in this and
other studies is a contemporary example of the
low engagement scenario of which Lord Wan-
less57 warned 5 years ago. Our ﬁndings contrast
starkly with the original policy vision of
empowered, information-literate patients
accessing their SCR via HealthSpace, correcting
inaccuracies and driving up the quality of data
(and indirectly, the quality of care).58
An NHS that is increasingly organized around
the assumption that people are partners in their
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own care and active choosers of particular ser-
vice developments and models is, arguably,
increasingly out of touch with a signiﬁcant
proportion of the population. Ensuring that
people are aware of their rights and choices in
relation to the sharing of their personal health
data is a challenging task. Ensuring that they
take full personal responsibility for opting in or
opting out is probably impossible. Not all
people have the motivation or the capacity to
engage with complex messages about sharing
electronic data. If we are to make any inroads
into the predominantly dont know, dont care
attitude towards shared electronic records,
policymakers need to take careful note of the
lessons learned from this study (Box 1). These
recommendations (which are not in order of
importance) are not a guarantee for success, but
may increase the chance of informing and
engaging potential participants in the
programme rather than merely fulﬁlling legal
requirements.
The lessons learnt in this study may have
wider implications for non-UK and non-
healthcare settings where citizens are asked to
make important decisions about participation in
a programme. However, whilst this study has
drawn eclectically on a number of diﬀerent
theories of communication to produce a preli-
minary unifying framework for the study of
contemporary information campaigns, there is
much scope for further theoretical and empirical
work in this area.
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